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 OPINION 
                      
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Elveth Warner and Jacqueline Monsanto-Swan, in two 
related cases, appeal from orders of the Appellate Division of 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands that dismissed their 
appeals for lack of jurisdiction.  These two cases present 
 
 
essentially the same issue of jurisdiction: whether the appellate 
division has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal of a defendant 
who has pled guilty where the defendant claims an error in the 
sentencing procedure.  Accordingly, we will address the two cases 
together.  Because the appellate division erred in determining 
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear these appeals, we will 
reverse. 
 
 I.  
 A.  Government of the Virgin Islands v. Warner 
 Elveth Warner was arrested and charged with possession 
of a controlled substance in violation of V.I. Code Ann. tit. 19, 
§ 607(a).  He pled guilty to this charge on September 8, 1989.  
At sentencing, which did not take place until May 5, 1993, Warner 
contended that he was prejudiced by a lengthy delay between his 
plea of guilty and sentencing.  According to the Government, the 
reason for the delay was that when this matter was first 
scheduled for sentencing, Warner did not appear and failed to 
inform either the court or his attorney as to his whereabouts. 
 The Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands sentenced 
Warner to a suspended 6 month period of incarceration, 400 hours 
of community service, a $700 fine, $25 in court costs, and placed 
him on supervised probation for one year.1  On appeal to the 
                     
1.  The territorial court stayed imposition of this sentence 
pending appeal.  Government of the Virgin Islands v. Warner, 
Crim. No. 290-89 (Terr. Ct. V.I.  May 26, 1993).  Accordingly, 
this matter is not moot.   
 
 
Appellate Division of the District Court of the Virgin Islands, 
Warner renewed his argument that he was prejudiced by the lengthy 
delay between his plea and sentencing.  The appellate division 
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  This appeal 
followed. 
 
 B.  Government of the Virgin Islands v. Monsanto-Swan 
 Jacqueline Monsanto-Swan was arrested and charged with 
misappropriating public monies to her own use in violation of 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 1662(1), and altering a check in 
violation of V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 791(1).  Monsanto-Swan 
pled guilty to count seven of a nine count information in 
exchange for the Government dismissing the remaining eight 
counts.  Count seven concerned the misappropriation of two checks 
worth an aggregate amount of $2,028.49.  At the change of plea 
hearing before the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands, the 
Government advised the court that it would make a recommendation 
for sentencing. 
 Shortly prior to the date of sentencing, the Government 
filed a motion seeking restitution from Monsanto-Swan pursuant to 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 3721.2  The Government moved the 
                     
2.  Section 3721 states: 
 
 If a person is convicted of a crime and is otherwise 
eligible, the court, by order, may withhold sentence or impose 
sentence and stay its execution, and in either case place the 
person on probation for a stated period, stating in the order the 
reasons therefor, and may impose any conditions of the probation 
which appear to be reasonable and appropriate to the court.  If 
the court places the person on probation, the court shall require 
restitution designed to compensate the victim's pecuniary loss 
 
 
territorial court to require $96,586.42 in restitution, the total 
of the various amounts alleged in the information.  Count seven, 
however, involved only the sum of $2,028.49.  In her response to 
the motion for restitution, Monsanto-Swan agreed not to oppose 
the Government's request for the larger amount, provided the 
sentence be imposed pursuant to V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 3721, 
and provided that the court permit a sufficient period of time 
for making restitution.  The territorial court accepted the 
Government's motion as unopposed and supported by Monsanto-Swan, 
and stated that it was going to withhold sentence pursuant to § 
3721 because Monsanto-Swan was expecting a baby.  The court, 
however, required Monsanto-Swan immediately to begin making 
restitution. 
 Prior to the new date set for sentencing, Monsanto-Swan 
had already paid $8,000 in restitution to the Government.  At 
sentencing, Monsanto-Swan contended that her agreement to pay the 
full amount of restitution entitled her to a sentence under § 
3721, a sentence that would not include incarceration as a 
(..continued) 
resulting from the crime to the extent possible, unless the court 
finds there is substantial reason not to order restitution as a 
condition of probation.  If the court does not require 
restitution to be paid to a victim, the court shall state its 
reason on the record.  The court may require that restitution be 
paid to an insurer or surety or government entity which has paid 
any claims or benefits to or on behalf of the victim.  If the 
court does require restitution, it shall specify the amount. 
 If the court does require restitution, it shall require the 
person or defendant to pay a surcharge equal to 5 percent of the 
amount of restitution to the clerk of the court for 
administrative expenses under this section. 
 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 3721 (Supp. 1993) 
 
 
component.  Over Monsanto-Swan's objection, however, the 
territorial court sentenced her to four years imprisonment. 
 Monsanto-Swan appealed this sentencing issue to the 
Appellate Division of the District Court of the Virgin Islands. 
The appellate division dismissed the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction.  Her appeal also followed. 
 
 II. 
 Jurisdiction in the Territorial Court of the Virgin 
Islands was predicated upon V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, § 76(b) (1993 
Supp.).  The Appellate Division of the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands dismissed this case for lack of jurisdiction.  We 
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c) (1988). 
 
 III. 
 Both Warner and Monsanto-Swan contend that the 
appellate division erred in dismissing their claims for lack of 
jurisdiction.  According to the defendants, Congress provided 
that local law would determine the jurisdiction of the appellate 
division of the district court.  Nevertheless, the defendants 
argue, local law cannot deny review of rights based on the United 
States Constitution.  We agree. 
 This Court exercises plenary review over questions of 
jurisdiction.  Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1016 
(3d Cir. 1991).  Title 48, § 1613a of the United States Code 
provides for the jurisdiction of the Appellate Division of the 
 
 
District Court of the Virgin islands.  This provision states, in 
pertinent part: 
 
 Prior to the establishment of the appellate court 
authorized by section 1611(a) of this title, 
 the District Court of the Virgin Islands shall have 
 such appellate jurisdiction over the courts of the 
 Virgin Islands established by local law to the 
extent now or hereafter prescribed by local law: 
Provided, That the legislature may not preclude the 
review of any judgment or order which involves the 
Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, 
including this chapter . . . . 
 
48 U.S.C. § 1613a(a) (1988) (first and third emphasis added).  
Accordingly, we must look to local law to determine the 
jurisdiction of the appellate division of the district court.   
 The applicable local law conferring jurisdiction upon 
the appellate division of the district court is V.I. Code Ann. 
tit. 4, § 33.  That section provides, in relevant part: 
 The district court has appellate jurisdiction to review 
the judgments and orders of the territorial court in 
all civil cases, in all juvenile and domestic relations 
cases, and in all criminal cases in which the defendant 
has been convicted, other than on a plea of guilty. 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, § 33 (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).  
According to the plain language of this statute, defendants who 
have pled guilty do not have an appeal to the appellate division 
of the district court.  The appellate division relied on this 
provision in dismissing the appeals of Warner and Monsanto-Swan.  
Jacqueline Monsanto-Swan v. Government of the Virgin Islands, No. 
92-211, slip op. at 6-7 (D.V.I. App. Div. May 2, 1994);  Elveth 
Warner v. Government of the Virgin Islands, No. 93-135, at 2 n.1 
(D.V.I. App. Div. June 16, 1994) (order of dismissal) (relying on 
 
 
Jacqueline Monsanto-Swan, No. 92-211 (D.V.I. App. Div. May 2, 
1994)).  According to the appellate division, because Warner and 
Monsanto-Swan pled guilty, it lacked jurisdiction.  Id.  We 
disagree. 
 Warner and Monsanto-Swan allege error in the sentencing 
procedure, not errors that occurred prior to pleading guilty.  
Taken literally, of course, § 33 does not distinguish between 
errors prior to the guilty plea and errors in sentencing.  
Indeed, as a matter of interpretation of this statute, we would 
find it difficult to conclude that the appellate division had 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal.  However, in the Revised 
Organic Act, Congress provided that local law cannot "preclude 
the review of any judgment or order which involves the 
Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States."  48 U.S.C. 
§ 1613a(a).  Therefore our inquiry must focus on whether the 
operation of § 33 in these cases creates such a result. 
 In the cases at hand, both Warner and Monsanto-Swan 
articulate colorable constitutional claims.  Warner contends that 
his sentence was imposed in violation of the Sixth Amendment.    
Warner correctly argues that the Sixth Amendment right to a 
speedy trial applies through sentencing.  Burkett v. Cunningham, 
826 F.2d 1208, 1220 (3d Cir. 1987).  Warner asserts that a delay 
in sentencing for over three and one half years, from September 
8, 1989 to May 5, 1993, violated his right to a speedy trial.  
While we do not pass on the merits of Warner's claim, we hold 
that Warner's appeal raises a constitutional issue.  Pursuant to 
 
 
§ 1613a(a), the local law of the Virgin Islands cannot preclude 
review of this constitutional issue. 
 Similarly, Monsanto-Swan's appeal raises a colorable 
constitutional claim.  Monsanto-Swan argues that the Government 
sought $96,586.42 in restitution.  According to Monsanto-Swan, 
this figure reflects the total of various restitution amounts 
charged in the information, not the restitution for the single 
charge to which she pled guilty.  Monsanto-Swan asserts that she 
agreed to the larger amount of restitution in exchange for an 
agreement by the court to sentence her pursuant to § 3721, a 
statute which speaks only about restitution and not about 
incarceration.3  Monsanto-Swan argues that she would not have 
agreed to such a large amount of restitution if she were aware 
that she could receive a period of incarceration in addition to 
this restitution. 
 In essence, Monsanto-Swan is alleging a violation of 
due process in the court's reneging on an alleged agreement as to 
sentencing.  Courts have recognized, in the context of a guilty 
plea, that where the court accepts a plea agreement, it cannot 
"`impose a sentence greater than that agreed upon.'"  United 
States v. Burruezo, 704 F.2d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting 
United States v. Mack, 655 F.2d 843, 847 n.4 (8th Cir. 1981)).  
While we express no position as to the strength of Monsanto-
Swan's due process claim, particularly because her allegations 
involve sentencing and not the guilty plea proceeding, we find 
                     
3.  See supra note 2 for the text of this statute. 
 
 
that Monsanto-Swan's allegations implicate a constitutional 
issue.  Accordingly, we conclude that the local law of the Virgin 
Islands may not preclude review of her claim. 
 Given that both Warner and Monsanto-Swan allege 
colorable constitutional claims, we are called upon to determine 
whether the operation of V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, § 33 in the 
matters at hand precludes review of these constitutional claims.  
The appellate division reasoned that because 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(a) 
does not state that direct review is required, dismissal of this 
action does not entirely preclude review of any alleged 
constitutional violations.  Jacqueline Monsanto-Swan, No. 92-211, 
slip op. at 7 n.6; Elveth Warner, No. 93-135, at 2 n.1 (order of 
dismissal) (relying on Jacqueline Monsanto-Swan, No. 92-211 
(D.V.I. App. Div. May 2, 1994)).  According to the appellate 
division, Warner and Monsanto-Swan can still bring a collateral 
proceeding, pursuant to local law, to challenge their sentences.  
Id. 
 We are unpersuaded by the appellate division's 
reasoning.  Concededly, the language of § 1613a(a) does not, by 
its own terms, state whether Congress believes collateral review 
to be sufficient to protect the constitutional rights at stake.  
We believe, however, that Congress did not intend to force a 
criminal defendant to institute a collateral proceeding in order 
to obtain review of such rights. 
 A prisoner's rights in a habeas corpus proceeding are 
more limited than on direct appeal.  For example, the Supreme 
Court has determined that while the Constitution guarantees the 
 
 
right to counsel on direct appeal, it does not guarantee the 
right to counsel in a habeas petition.  Wright v. West,     U.S.    
, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2490 (1992) (citing Douglas v. California, 372 
U.S. 353, 355-58, 83 S. Ct. 814, 815-17 (1963)); Pennsylvania v. 
Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 1993 (1987).  The 
Supreme Court has also explained that while defendants whose 
direct appeals are pending get the benefit of new constitutional 
rules of criminal procedure, a new constitutional rule is not 
applicable to collateral proceedings unless the rule falls within 
certain narrowly defined exceptions.  See Teague v. Lane, 489 
U.S. 288, 310-12, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1075-76 (1989).  According to 
the Court, these differences "simply reflect the fact that habeas 
review `entails significant costs.'"  Wright,     U.S. at    , 
112 S. Ct. at 2491 (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126, 102 
S. Ct. 1558, 1571 (1982)).  We conclude that the more limited 
rights provided to a prisoner on collateral review are 
insufficient to give proper effect to the language of § 1613a(a) 
that requires a forum for review of issues involving the 
Constitution.  Therefore, we hold that the local law of the 
Virgin Islands cannot operate to deny these parties a direct 
appeal to the appellate division. 
 Accordingly, we will reverse the orders of the 
appellate division which dismissed these appeals for lack of 
jurisdiction and remand these cases back to that court for 
further consideration on the merits.4 
                     
4.  To the extent that Monsanto-Swan asserts other claims that do 




law, we find that the appellate division of the district court 
was correct in dismissing such claims for lack of jurisdiction.  
Since the appellate division dismissed all of Monsanto-Swan's 
claims without deciding which ones involved constitutional 
issues, we leave to that court the task of categorizing Monsanto-
Swan's claims into those that involve constitutional issues, and 
those that do not.  Because Warner's sole claim on appeal 
involves the right to a speedy trial, a constitutional right, we 
simply direct that the appellate division exercise its 
jurisdiction to hear this claim.  
